As concepções brentaniana e neo-brentaniana dos objetos das sensações
Vol 18, No 3 (2014) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Arthur Octavio de Melo Araujo
The paper proposes an analysis of the Bretanian conception of the objects of sensations and a review of the neo-Brentanian literature on this theme. Starting from the Brentanian thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional, it intends to analyze if the objects of sensations would have the same intentional property. This is also an issue on the meaning and the home of the objects of sensations. From the analysis of the Brentanian thesis, in parallel, the paper seeks to identify the extent and the limit of a representationalist perspective in Philosophy of Mind. Finally, it indicates a form of adverbialism as a possible alternative to a representationalist view on the objects of sensations.
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2014v18n3p337/29898
Palavras-Chave: Brentano,sensations,representation, mind
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2